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Abstract 
This paper explores the institutional changes of international tax governance in re-
sponse to growing politicization and contestation of international direct tax issues. I 
show that politicization – which is a very recent phenomenon in international taxation 
– results from a governance gap. The traditional setup of international tax cooperation 
has an unintended consequence in the form of harmful tax competition. In reaction to 
this problem, civil society groups have begun to question the effectiveness and fair-
ness of the minimal international tax order, lobbying national governments and inter-
national organizations for more effective international regulation of tax issues. Thus, 
in contrast to existing hypotheses, societal politicization does not result from the 
increasing scope and authority of international institutions, but rather from the lack 
thereof. However, civil society demands have so far not led to institutional changes in 
international taxation. Instead, we can only observe indirect and incremental change, 
which falls short of what would ultimately be needed to address harmful tax competi-
tion effectively.  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Politisierung und institutioneller (Nicht-)Wandel 
des internationalen Steuerregimes 
Dieses Papier untersucht den institutionellen Wandel des internationalen Steuerre-
gimes in Reaktion auf eine zunehmende Politisierung internationaler Steuerangelegen-
heiten. Gesellschaftliche Politisierung, die im Bereich der internationalen Besteuerung 
ein sehr junges Phänomen ist, hat ihre Ursache in einer Governancelücke. Das traditi-
onelle institutionelle Arrangement zur Vermeidung von internationaler Doppelbesteu-
erung hat nicht-intendierte Nebenfolgen in der Form von schädlichem und unfairem 
Steuerwettbewerb. Als Reaktion auf dieses Problem haben zivilgesellschaftliche 
Akteure den Mangel an Effektivität und Fairness skandalisiert. Sie versuchen nationa-
le Regierungen und internationale Organisationen zu mehr internationaler Regulierung 
des Steuerwettbewerbs anzutreiben. Anders als in Teilen der Literatur angenommen 
wird, ist die gesellschaftliche Politisierung nicht das Resultat eines Zuwachses an 
politischem Einfluss von nicht ausreichend legitimierten internationalen Institutionen, 
sondern sie thematisiert im Gegenteil den Mangel an effektiven internationalen 
Institutionen. Die zivilgesellschaftlichen Forderungen haben bisher nicht zu institutio-
nellen Reformen geführt. Stattdessen lässt sich lediglich indirekter und inkrementeller 
Wandel beobachten, der nicht ausreichend ist, um das Problem schädlichen Steuer-
wettbewerbs zu lösen. 
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Introduction 
One can hardly imagine a politically more salient and contested subject than the issue 
of taxation. The common demand for “no taxation without representation” and the 
never-ending political debates over what constitutes just or fair tax policy are obvious 
examples for the importance of the public finances in politics, just as is the central role 
assigned to the adoption of national budgets in parliamentary democracies.1 
However, tax policy has only been highly politicized within nation-states. The 
flipside of politicization in the national arena is the traditionally very strong de-
politicization of international tax policy. Because taxes are so strongly linked to 
national political communities, governments have an interest in finding institutional 
solutions for international taxation, which preserve national sovereignty. The primary 
– and for many decades the sole – aim of cooperation in international taxation has 
been to avoid double taxation resulting from international investment and trade. 
National ministerial tax experts were engaged in coordinating potentially overlapping 
or competing tax claims. This task was considered a technically complex but nonpoli-
tical undertaking. The resulting institutions of double tax avoidance territorially 
disentangle the jurisdiction to tax in a way that leaves governments free to decide over 
all relevant aspects of their national tax systems. Thus, tax could remain a national 
political affair. In the course of the last two decades, however, as a result of intensified 
globalization and tax competition, this system has become deficient. As a consequence 
international taxation has become noticeably politicized. 
This politicization and the extent to which it may, or may not, have led to changes 
in the institutional arrangement is the subject of this paper. Its message is that even in 
tax policy, which can be considered a “hard case” for international politicization 
because of taxation’s strong association with the nation-state, civil society actors have 
recently begun to voice demands of global distributive justice. However, so far they 
have not been able to achieve change. 
In particular, I will address the following two points that are related to the hy-
potheses developed by Zürn et al. (2007). First, in line with the general description of 
                                                          
1 Consider, for example, the following quotations: “Ideologically loaded battles over tax policy ... 
are the bread and butter of politics” (Murphy and Nagel 2002). “In the most integral sense the budget 
lies at the heart of the political process” (Wildavsky 1979, 5). 
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the institutional development of the post-World-War-II international order by Zürn et 
al. (2007, 137-8, 141-8), the sovereignty-preserving institutional construction of the 
international tax regime produced unintended consequences in the form of tax avoid-
ance, evasion and tax competition. To effectively address these problems would 
require institutional solutions that go beyond the traditional sovereignty-preserving 
approach and constrain national policy choices by harmonizing at least certain aspects 
of national tax systems. Likewise any international agreement to such an effect must 
be monitored and enforced. Since this would run counter to the interests of some 
nation states, it could not be achieved in the traditional consensual mode of intergov-
ernmental agreements, i.e. it would ultimately involve a supranational component.2 
However, the need for such institutional reform is not met. Rather, actors respond with 
incremental and indirect changes of the existing institutional arrangement. These 
changes involve the intensification of transgovernmental administrative cooperation 
and layering new institutions on top of the existing setup in order to support its viabil-
ity. However, governments take great care to re-construe the rule changes in a way 
that is, while de facto violating it, at least formally compatible with the traditional 
principle of sovereignty-preserving cooperation. 
Second, the lack of effective regulation of tax competition is the main reason for 
the politicization of international taxation. Contrary to what Zürn et al. (2007, 139-40, 
149-157) hypothesize, the politicization of international taxation is not the result of 
growing influence and power of the relevant International Organizations in the field. 
They hypothesize that the increased influence that comes with the suspension of 
consensus in supranational or transnational organizations provokes a counter-reaction 
of civil society actors, because the organizations lack (democratic) legitimacy. In 
taxation, however, the story is different. It is the lack of an institution outfitted with 
sufficient authority to effectively regulate tax competition between countries, which 
leads to dissatisfaction with the status quo and, ultimately, to politicization. Rather 
than scandalizing a legitimacy gap of international institutions that are too influential, 
civil society actors criticize the governance gap resulting from the lack of an effective 
international institution. 
                                                          
2 On this definition of supranationalism, see Zürn et al. (2007, 137). 
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It follows from this that the development of international tax policy does not cor-
respond to the hypothesized sequence, namely, that institutional transformation 
towards transnationalization or supranationalization precedes politicization (Zürn et al. 
2007, 139). In international taxation, the observed incremental change occurs simulta-
neously with politicization. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I first provide an overview of the 
development of international taxation and describe the nature of the governance gap 
(part 1). In part 2, I turn to the politicization of international tax issues by civil society 
actors and their demands for closing the governance gap. Part 3 addresses the institu-
tional response to civil society criticism. I argue that societal concerns have so far not 
had an impact on intergovernmental policy-making, pre-occupied with merely incre-
mental, path-dependent attempts at institutional reform. The governance gap is not 
closed. Likewise, the international organizations active in the area of tax policy only 
grant limited access to civil society actors. 
A Brief History of International Tax Policy 
Initially, the only goal of international tax policy was the avoidance of double taxa-
tion. The problem of double taxation consists in an overlap of jurisdiction to tax of a 
residence state, the country in which the recipient of international income resides, and 
the source state, where the investment was made and the income was generated. If 
both states were to fully tax the income, the total tax burden for the international 
investment would be significantly higher than for comparable national investments 
(see e.g. Musgrave 2006). Therefore, as early as the 1920s and 1930s, under the 
umbrella of the League of Nations, governmental representatives and tax experts from 
academia and business came together to draw up principles for a solution to the 
problem of overlapping tax claims. 
Finding a satisfactory solution to allocating the right to tax between residence and 
source state proved to be difficult. There are good arguments, based on different 
normative assumptions, in support of both the residence and the source principle. If 
one adheres to the idea of taxation based on ability to pay, then one is likely to favor 
taxation by the residence state. Conversely, considering that a business enterprise 
depends on the availability and use of infrastructure at the location where goods are 
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produced, then taxing at the source, in accordance with the principle of benefit taxa-
tion, is justified. Both of these arguments are simple and intuitive. None of the schol-
ars that have discussed the issue of a desirable allocation of taxing rights have come 
out in favor of only the one or the other, but for some solution that accords different 
weights to these considerations (for a brief overview of the continuing debate, see e.g. 
Li 2003, 49-57). 
In the political debates these theoretical issues of a legitimate link between a tax-
payer and the country that wishes to exert its power to tax were mixed with material 
distributive conflicts. For countries that are net capital exporters – that is, importers of 
the income earned from this capital – taxation on a residence basis is advantageous. 
Conversely, net capital importers prefer taxation at source (see e.g. Dagan 2000; Rixen 
2008, chapter 7). To make a long story short, the solution that ultimately emerged was 
based on a compromise between the residence and source principle. The tax treatment 
depends on the type of income (schedular taxation); in essence, active capital income 
is to be taxed predominantly at the source, whereas passive income is taxed in the state 
of residence (see e.g. Avi-Yonah, 2006).3 
In order to institutionalize the compromise solution, a series of legal constructs 
were created that establish a nexus between the transnational tax base and a country 
(Bird and Wilkie, 2000: 91-5). For example, the permanent establishment (PE) con-
cept codified what is taxable as a separate entity in the source state. The allocation of 
taxable profits to the different entities of an MNE is governed under the arm’s length 
standard (ALS). The distribution should correspond to that which would result if the 
different parts of an enterprise were to act independently from one another on the 
market – that is, for purposes of taxation, the parts of an enterprise are treated as if 
they were separate businesses (see e.g. Li 2003, chapter 3). 
The important point about these and other legal constructs – which are in use until 
today – is that the rules defined internationally are kept at a minimum. The interna-
tional rules for the avoidance of double taxation achieve nothing more (and nothing 
less) than territorially disentangling the transnational tax base and assigning it to 
different jurisdictions. They do not prescribe whether and how a state ought to exer-
                                                          
3 There are important exceptions to this general pattern: for example, the source state has the right 
to levy withholding taxes on dividends, interest, androyalties (see e.g. Avi-Yonah 1996). 
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cise this right; the internal qualities of national tax systems are not subject to the 
regime rules. Once jurisdiction to tax is established, the country is basically free to use 
its own national tax law on the respective income. The approach is not aimed at 
harmonizing national tax laws (Li 2003, 33) but merely at coordinating the interfaces 
of autonomous national tax systems.4 Governments retain almost unlimited sover-
eignty over their share of the transnational tax base; they are free to design all ele-
ments of their tax systems – tax base, rate and system – as they wish (Rixen 2008, 
chapter 4).5 
Originally, the goal was to codify the rules in a multilateral double taxation agree-
ment (DTA); but governments were loath to submit to this kind of multilateral con-
tract. A non-binding agreement was reached – a model convention (MC) – on which 
basis states could negotiate binding bilateral treaties. The MC was regularly updated 
and further developed. This occurred initially under the aegis of the League of Na-
tions, thereafter for a brief period under the United Nations, and since the 1950s, it is 
sponsored by the OECD. Today, the MC is the international de facto standard for 
double taxation avoidance. 
From the 1920s to the early part of the 1930s, only a few bilateral DTAs were ac-
tually negotiated. The economic crisis of the 1930s and the Second World War in the 
1940s caused political interest in cross-border business relationships and worldwide 
economic integration to decline. By the end of the 1950s, there were only about 270 
bilateral DTAs in force. During the 1960s, but above all in the 1980s, interest began to 
                                                          
4 This is perhaps best illustrated through a comparison with other potential solutions to the prob-
lem of double taxation. In a system of “international corporate taxation,” the power to levy taxes would 
rest with a supranational organization which would define the tax base, fix the tax rates, and determine 
the method of collection. Under “unitary taxation with formula apportionment,” the tax base would be 
jointly determined. States could still decide on their own desired tax rate and apply it to their appor-
tioned part of this tax base, which would be determined by a fixed formula which could be based, for 
instance, on factors such as a company’s wage bill, its assets, or its turnover (see e.g. McIntyre 2004). 
With each of these potential alternatives to the actually chosen method of international taxation, some 
elements of the national tax systems would be internationally determined: in the case of “international 
corporate taxation,” this would be all three essential elements – tax base, rates, and system; in the case 
of “unitary taxation with formula apportionment,” this would be just one element – namely, the tax 
base. The sovereignty to determine one’s own national tax system would be shared with other states. 
5 Nevertheless, the chosen form of coordination requires intensive international cooperation at the 
administrative level, whenever in concrete cases it becomes necessary to properly restrict a country’s 
right to tax. Especially in the determination of transfer prices, the participating states often have to 
engage in complex agreement procedures. In other words, the solution opted for permits the states broad 
legislative sovereignty but, at the same time, it limits their de facto administrative sovereignty in the 
implementation of tax law (cf. Picciotto 1992, 35). See also the discussion in part 3 below. 
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grow in liberalization of capital flows and, with this, the avoidance of double taxation. 
From then on the true value of the model convention as a blueprint for transaction-
cost-effective negotiations of bilateral double taxation agreements really showed. The 
number of DTAs increased rapidly to more than 2000 as of today; and almost all of the 
agreements follow the OECD MC in form and content. The original solution – mani-
fest in the non-binding multilateral MC, binding bilateral DTAs and national rules of 
international taxation – became firmly entrenched. Whereas details of the OECD MC 
have been continuously developed, its fundamental building blocks have remained 
unaltered (see e.g. Graetz 2001). 
Over time, the OECD has established itself not only as a generally recognized fo-
rum, but in fact the most important one for discussion, diffusion of information, and 
further development of international taxation. Tax experts from national ministries 
serve as representatives on the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA). Here they 
work continuously on refinements to the model convention and the development of 
non-binding rules or recommendations concerning various technical matters – for 
instance, the determination of transfer prices. In general, the CFA can be considered a 
transgovernmental expertocracy. Even though no binding decisions are taken within 
this committee this multilateral forum nevertheless has a significant influence on 
international tax policy, because it developed and continuously refines the basic 
principles and legal constructs on which international tax law, in the form of bilateral 
treaties and national rules of international taxation, is based. This setup can be de-
scribed as bilateralism on the basis of multilateralism.6 
The only societal actors that participated in this process of constructing the inter-
national double tax regime were business representatives. In fact the issue of interna-
tional double taxation was put on the agenda of the League of Nations by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which also participated in all the meetings. 
Likewise the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) represents business 
interests within the OECD’s CFA. Although business representatives have only 
advisory capacity, they nevertheless have a strong influence on the development of 
                                                          
6 For an explanation of why “bilateralism based on multilaterialism” was chosen, see Rixen and 
Rohlfing (2007). 
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international taxation (Webb 2006). Other civil society actors, not even to mention the 
broad public, have not been involved in designing the rules of double tax avoidance. 
All in all, the DTA regime, even though its historical origins lie in a time prior to 
World War II, fits nicely into the picture of “executive multilateralism” (Zürn et al. 
2007, 133). The regulatory structure described here is that of a “traditional interna-
tional institution” for three reasons (on these criteria, see Zürn 2004, 269): (1) its 
addressees are states, (2) it deals with an interface problem, and (3) the effects of the 
regulation were predictable with relative certainty (at least as long as the liberalization 
of capital flows was not quite as advanced). 
The Endogenous Creation of Tax Competition: The Origin of the Governance Gap 
The construction of the DTA regime leads to unintended consequences. Explicitly, the 
rules of double tax avoidance address only governments and tell them how to structure 
their international tax relations. Implicitly, however, these same rules also tell enter-
prises how they can arrange their cross-border transactions to minimize their tax 
payments. The DTA regime pre-structures taxpayers’ avoidance techniques. For 
example, the schedular structure of DTAs allows taxpayers to apply specific practices 
– for instance, substituting equity with debt – in order to reclassify their financial 
flows in a tax optimal way. Another method of avoidance that builds on an important 
aspect of the DTA regime is the manipulation of arm’s length transfer prices.7 
Such transactions often use the services of base or conduit companies – better 
known as “letter box companies” – located in low-tax countries or tax havens. With 
the aid of base companies, an enterprise can intentionally manipulate its legal state of 
residence in order to accumulate profits tax-free or at least at a very low rate. A 
company can also channel financial flows through a conduit company, which can be 
advantageous if, in the course of such transactions, the company gains access to 
                                                          
7 Because of its susceptibility to manipulation, the arm’s length standard has always been highly 
controversial in the literature. The irony and particular difficulty with the ALS is that, according to 
current economic theory, multinational enterprises have come into existence in the first place because of 
the absence or imperfection of markets for certain transactions; but exactly the comparison with a 
market is what is needed for purposes of determining transfer prices. Thus the determination of ALS 
transfer prices is seen by many to constitute a “fiscal myth” (Bird 1988, 299). 
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advantageous DTAs, which would otherwise not be applicable (“treaty shopping”).8 
With these and other similar techniques taxpayers make sure that profits are taxable in 
low-tax countries, while losses occur in high-tax states. What these methods have in 
common is that none of them rely on the relocation of real business activities – such as 
making direct investments in a low-tax jurisdiction – but on the mere shifting of 
“paper” profits and losses. There is empirical evidence that this is a quantitatively 
important phenomenon and that tax competition is to a significant extent structured 
around methods of profit shifting (see the overview in Rixen 2007, 64-8). 
This form of tax arbitrage is possible because the DTA regime gives states the 
freedom to design their own national tax laws. The sovereignty-preserving approach to 
double tax cooperation creates an opportunity structure for taxpayers and govern-
ments: taxpayers demand tax optimization and seek to avoid taxes; governments can 
satisfy this demand with corresponding offers, because the international rules give 
them the power to structure their national tax legislation to meet this demand. Thus, 
the system itself pre-determines the kinds of tax law adaptations that states will use in 
the attempt to attract tax base – it determines how individual states will try to win tax 
competition. The result is tax competition among all countries. The DTA regime not 
only creates the institutional framework for the avoidance of double taxation, it also 
unintentionally provides the institutional foundation for tax arbitrage and competition 
(Rixen 2008, chapters 4 and 8). 
Even though they are not competing first and foremost for direct investments, the 
possibilities for enterprises to shift paper profits, and the resulting tax competition 
among countries, have negative consequences. Although on average hardly any 
revenue losses related to business taxation are detectable, the real consequences of tax 
competition reveal themselves in the structure of tax systems (see e.g. Ganghof 2006, 
Ganghof and Genschel 2008, Rixen 2007): large, highly profitable MNEs enjoy 
favorable tax treatment over small and medium-sized enterprises. Taxes are shifted 
away from capital onto labor and consumption. The decrease in nominal business tax 
rates undermines the progressivity of individual income taxes. In short, tax competi-
                                                          
8 For an overview of these and other strategies of international tax optimization, see e.g. Arnold 
and McIntyre (1995, 8-17 and 69-88). 
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tion restricts the autonomy of governments in the design of their own tax policies; in 
particular, the leeway for redistribution via taxation is limited.9 
Whereas economic liberalization in the form of double taxation avoidance has 
progressed a great deal through successful international cooperation, a governance gap 
in the form of lacking regulation of the economic and social side effects of liberaliza-
tion has developed. There are neither international rules to regulate tax competition – 
which would have to aim at some degree of standardization among national tax 
systems – nor is there an international organization with sufficient competence to 
enforce such rules. In many cases, there is not even information exchange between 
national tax administrations. 
Countermeasures: Incremental Instead of Fundamental Reform 
Nevertheless, governments are not willing just to surrender to this situation and have 
tried to at least limit the damage. The most important of these measures shall briefly 
be discussed here (for more detail, see Rixen 2008, chapter 6). 
Some governments have developed unilateral measures against tax avoidance. 
These have, in the meantime, through diffusion via the OECD, been adopted by 
basically all major capital exporting nations (see e.g. Arnold 2000). In the 1960s, the 
United States was the first country to introduce unilateral anti-avoidance legislation. 
The so-called controlled foreign companies (CFC) legislation is directly aimed at the 
use of foreign subsidiaries as base or conduit companies in tax haven countries, which 
serve no substantive economic purpose but the tax privileged holding of assets for the 
group. Resident shareholders, e.g. the parents of an MNE, controlling a subsidiary in a 
tax haven are taxable on the income of the subsidiary in the current period, whether or 
not the income is actually distributed to them. Thus, CFC rules pierce the “corporate 
veil” of the tax haven entity and violate the principle of treating all parts of an MNE as 
separate national entities. 
                                                          
9 This interpretation contradicts the claim by some political scientists that tax competition resulting 
from globalization does not represent any serious restrictions on leftist or social democratic policies (cf. 
e.g. Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002; Swank and Steinmo 2002). These authors base their 
conclusion on the observation that revenues from business taxation have not declined. Nevertheless, 
what they overlook is that the expansion of the tax base coupled with a simultaneous reduction in 
nominal tax rates—a move which was necessary in order to retain the same level of tax revenues—led 
to an unjust distribution of the tax burden (cf., for more details, Ganghof 2006; Rixen 2007). 
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Another area in which efforts at reform have been made is that of transfer pricing. 
With the multinationalization of production and the rising importance of intangibles – 
trademarks, patents and other intellectual property – the ALS comes under pressure. 
Again, the US was the first country to push for changes. In the 1990s it adopted new 
transfer pricing guidelines and subsequently the OECD recommendations were also 
reformed (Webb 2001). Since then the guidelines are in a state of almost perpetual 
adaptation (see, most recently, OECD 2008b). Overall, the new guidelines move the 
actual rules closer to considering the consolidated profits of the MNE but take great 
care to formally reinforce the principle of separate entity accounting on a transactional 
basis (Bird and Wilkie, 2000: 92; Vincent 2005). With the introduction of advanced 
pricing agreements (APAs) in many countries and their promotion by the OECD, this 
trend has become even more pronounced. APAs are mechanisms under which MNEs 
and tax administrations can bargain over the appropriate method of arriving at reason-
able transfer prices and thus basically commit to certain prices before the transactions 
actually take place. Some have argued that APAs are only a secret method of applying 
formula apportionment on a business-by-business basis (US Senator Dorgan, cited 
after Célestin, 2000: 130).  
In addition to these unilateral approaches, there have also been international and 
collective efforts at reform. For example, twenty years ago a multilateral convention 
on information exchange was developed (Council of Europe/OECD), and this conven-
tion has since been ratified by thirteen countries (OECD 2008a). 
Another attempt to combat the problem of tax competition that has received some 
public attention, was the OECD Project on Harmful Tax Practices (OECD 1998), 
begun in the mid-1990s. The original aim of the project was to force tax havens to 
modify their national tax laws so that it would no longer be possible for multinational 
enterprises to merely book profits in a low-tax country without having any bona fide 
business activity there. But, after resistance from the tax havens and pressure from the 
US following the change of government to George W. Bush, the OECD project 
modified its original aim, so that now the goal is just to intensify information ex-
change and administrative cooperation (see, most recently, OECD 2007; for more 
details on the OECD project, see Rixen 2007; Sharman 2006b). However, information 
exchange is not going to be automatic, but will still have to be requested by the 
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authorities, who must present a suspicion to obtain information. According to many 
experts only automatic information exchange can be effective in preventing evasion 
and avoidance (see e.g. Sullivan 2007, 332-334). 
The progress thus far achieved in the battle against tax avoidance, evasion, and 
competition is not sufficient to get the problem under control. The efforts to limit 
damage – which were not even devised with the aim to create an effective institution 
for the regulation of tax competition – cannot close the governance gap. 
The Politicization of the Governance Gap in International Taxation 
At least since the OECD Project on Harmful Tax Practices, it has become obvious that 
the normative issues at stake in international taxation can no longer be treated as 
purely technical issues. The question of justice between rich industrialized countries 
and small, sometimes poor, sometimes wealthy tax havens, the matter of fairness and 
equity between different groups of taxpayers, and the meaning of fiscal sovereignty in 
the age of globalization are issues that have finally made their way onto the agendas of 
governments and international organizations. In the course of this development, the 
propensity for conflict has also risen sharply. This holds not only for the relationships 
among governments: one can also observe an increasing “politicization” – in the sense 
of that term suggested by Zürn et al. (2007, 149), who see growing civil society 
demands as the defining feature of politicization. In international taxation, civil 
society’s demands aim, above all, at closing the governance gap.10 
The Origins of Politicization: International Taxation as a Latecomer 
In the course of the development of a civil society movement against one-sided 
neoliberal globalization, international taxation policy has also become more politi-
cized. Since the early and mid-1990s a growing number of NGOs and a growing 
number of activities and campaigns could be observed (Rucht 2005, 187-190). Taxa-
tion policy was repeatedly referred to, and tax competition was decried in general 
                                                          
10 “Politicization should be understood as a process in which societal actors, be they organized at 
the national or transnational level, make increasing demands on governance beyond the nation state”. 
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terms. The probably best-known NGO in the spectrum of globalization critics, Attac,11 
devoted some attention to tax policy, its main demand being the introduction of the 
Tobin tax to regulate financial markets. Not until 2000, however, did civil society 
actors start to take a closer look at the international aspects of direct taxation; the 
biggest campaign which dealt with this subject explicitly was that of Oxfam (2000). 
In 2002 the Tax Justice Network (TJN) was formed. This organization quickly 
developed into the main civil society crystallization point for matters concerning 
international tax evasion, tax fraud, capital flight, and tax competition. TJN is a 
network of activists, tax experts, journalists, and development experts that grew out of 
the global processes of the World Social Forums (WSF) and the international Attac 
movement. The declared goal of the network is “[to work] for international tax co-
operation and against tax evasion and tax competition” (Tax Justice Network (TJN) 
2005, ii). In the few years of its existence, TJN has already succeeded in making a 
name for itself through its mention on the business pages of various prominent news-
papers, having supplied the media with facts, figures, and stories of tax evasion 
strategies by private persons and enterprises (see e.g. “Places in the Sun,” The Econo-
mist, 24 February 2007; Houlder 2006; Lawrence and Griffiths 2007).12 
International tax policy clearly experienced its initial “politicization boost” later 
than other areas of economic policy. The main reason for this is probably that in the 
mind of most political actors, issues of taxation are so closely linked to the nation state 
that international taxation was for a very long time perceived to be a non-issue. The 
sovereignty-preserving institutional design of international tax governance may have 
reinforced this view. Additionally, many have argued that the relative lag in the 
politicization process is due to the complexity of the subject matter. National tax rules 
are notoriously complicated, the international rules, which were designed to disentan-
gle these national tax systems, are accordingly even more complicated.13 “The issues 
are multi-faceted, and tax havens are steeped in secrecy and complexity – which helps 
                                                          
11 Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens = Associa-
tion for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens. 
12 A search through the “Factiva” database on 28 January 2008 yielded the following statistics for 
number of mentions of the Tax Justice Network in all of the “major news and business publications:” 
TJN was cited six times in 2003, 21 times in 2004, 54 times in 2005, 45 times in 2006, and 65 times in 
2007. 
13 Albert Einstein is claimed to have said that “[t]he hardest thing in the world to understand is the 
income tax” (quoted in Slemrod and Bakija 2004, ix). 
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explain why so few people have woken up to the scandal of offshore, and why civil 
society has been almost silent on international taxation for so long” (TJN 2007, see 
also Christensen/Spencer 2008). Many civil society activists simply did not have the 
expertise necessary to operate competently in this policy area, and thus gain the ear of 
policymakers. 
In the meantime, however, this has changed. Within TJN there are a number of 
recognized tax experts who could close the competence gap (Webb 2006, 109). Given 
that these individuals consider it an essential part of their work to convey the basic 
principles of international tax policy to the public (TJN 2007), the complexity of the 
issues itself should no longer pose the significant barrier to further politicization – or 
to counter-act the strategy of de-politicization of business interests14 – of this policy 
area. Commenting on the intensified activities of NGOs in the field of international 
taxation Jeffrey Owens, Director of the OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Admini-
stration (CTPA), remarked that “[t]ax is where the environment was ten years ago” 
(quoted in Houlder 2004). 
The Demands of Civil Society 
If we consider the statements by NGOs on international tax policy, it becomes clear 
that their main interest is to scandalize the status quo of international tax competition. 
The campaigns of these organizations are designed to put the current injustices in 
international tax policy on the public agenda, and thus to create a broader awareness 
for the importance of this problem among the general public (cf. e.g. TJN 2007). 
One of the most important issues on their agenda is the link between international 
tax injustice and development. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the 
consequences of tax competition because, unlike the rich OECD countries, the former 
often have only weak tax administrations at their disposal and are thus unable to 
                                                          
14 Webb (2006) has argued that, in the area of international income taxation, it would be especially 
easy for business interests to attain a powerful level of influence. Because of the complexity of the 
subject matter, only very few civil society organizations actually possess the necessary know-how to 
function competently on the same plane as their adversaries. In contrast, representatives of transnation-
ally organized business interests have far greater resources and knowledge at their disposal, enabling 
them to influence the development of the international tax regime. This “epistemic community,” 
comprised of tax bureaucrats and business association representatives has thus succeeded in excluding 
civil society from international tax matters by defining the issues as being “purely technical” in nature. 
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adequately pursue wealthy taxpayers and tax evaders (Oxfam 2000).15 Christian Aid 
(2008) estimates the annual revenue loss of developing countries from transfer mis-
pricing and false invoicing (under- or overvaluing the actual price of a commodity in 
official documentation to strip a company off profits) to be US $ 160 billion. An 
important demand is for developed countries and International Organizations to assist 
developing countries in building effective tax systems by curbing tax competition (see 
e.g. Martens 2007;TJN 2005a, 54).16 
Although NGOs acknowledge the fact that the OECD broached the problem with 
its Project on Harmful Tax Practices, the project has been subject to criticism by these 
groups, because up to now it has failed to achieve progress to any notable or satisfac-
tory extent (Giegold 2004; TJN 2007). In particular, disapproval has been expressed at 
the fact that, to the detriment of small island nations, many of which are developing 
countries, the OECD initiative has concentrated too one-sidedly on their unfair tax 
practices, while handling those of OECD countries less stringently. Tax avoidance and 
evasion, however, are more widespread phenomena that involve the offshore activities 
of small islands as well as the onshore activities in OECD countries, like those, for 
instance, in the big financial centers of London and New York (Oxfam 2000). 
The leitmotiv of civil society engagement is their criticism of the incomplete regu-
lation of international tax competition. They argue that the imbalance between glob-
ally operating taxpayers (enterprises and individuals), on the one side, and purely 
national tax systems, on the other, must be eliminated. This can ultimately only occur 
if the respective governments intensify international cooperation in matters of taxation 
(cf. e.g. TJN 2005a; Oxfam 2000). To this end, activists have drawn up a set of 
demands and made a number of proposals. 
                                                          
15 TJN cites a study by the Boston Consulting Group, which shows that wealthy private house-
holds in developing countries deposit a higher portion of their assets in tax havens than do wealthy 
individuals in North America and Europe. According to these estimates, in Latin America, for instance, 
more than 50% of the cash assets of its wealthiest residents are deposited in tax havens; in the Near 
East, this figure is as high as 70% (TJN 2005a, 5-6). Other empirical studies also show that developing 
countries are particularly negatively affected by the consequences of tax competition. While developed 
countries only experienced a change in their tax structure, developing countries additionally lost tax 
revenues (Keen and Simone 2004). 
16 As an interesting aside: Some development NGOs are skeptical of the tax justice agenda, be-
cause they fear that the focus on mobilizing tax revenues in developing countries may let developed 
countries off the hook of being responsible for helping developing countries (see e.g. Wilks 2008). 
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They propose to create a “World Tax Organization” to guarantee that individual 
countries’ tax policy decisions would also consider the interests of all people and all 
countries.17 In the eyes of TJN, the most suitable organization to assume such a role 
would be the United Nations. While, over the years, the OECD has accumulated an 
impressive level of expertise in international tax policy, it is not seen to adequately 
represent the interests of all countries, but only those of rich nations. At the same time, 
activists would like to strengthen the UN’s Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters. Because of its inclusive membership, this body is seen as 
the only one on a global level with enough legitimacy to be considered a potential 
nucleus of a World Tax Organization (TJN 2005a, 52-4). The main task of this new 
agency, in addition to taking over the work now done by the OECD, would be to 
devote itself intensively to the matter of tax competition and capital flight (TJN 2005a, 
39). However, TJN criticizes the UN Committee of Experts, which is currently too 
badly funded, for concerning itself too much with the technical details of DTAs 
instead of the more basic options for reform (Gurtner and Picciotto 2006). 
With its preference for the UN to become the main forum of international tax pol-
icy, TJN has joined developing countries. Since the latter are not members of the 
OECD, developing countries sought to create a counterweight to that organization 
within the framework of the UN. Since the late 1970s, the United Nations began to 
become active in the area of tax policy, and drafted a model convention which was 
designed to be favorable to the developing countries who are traditionally capital 
importers and therefore prefer the source principle. Although the UN possesses greater 
legitimacy because of its broader membership (Horner 2001), its deficit in resources in 
the area of tax policy has meant that up to now it has posed no threat to the position of 
the OECD in international taxation matters. The OECD, however, as a reaction to the 
criticism, has since began to allow developing countries to attend the meetings of the 
CFA (Rixen 2008, chapter 5). 
In any case, activists do not support a utopian demand for a world government 
that is equipped with its own power to tax; rather TJN is of the opinion that tax policy 
ought to be governed within democratically constituted nations. For this reason, they 
                                                          
17 Proposals for a world taxation organization, although with a more limited scope, can also be 
found in the academic literature: e.g. Tanzi (1999) and Horner (2001). 
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do not proclaim a far-reaching harmonization of national tax policies as their main 
objective. Instead, they are concerned with closing the governance gap so that gov-
ernments are in a better position to bring their tax systems in line with the preferences 
of their constituencies. In other words, the real issue is to safeguard national tax policy 
through international governance (TJN 2005b). 
Some concrete demands – independent from calls for a new international regula-
tory institution – are the following. First, concerning personal income taxes, TJN 
supports the enforcement of the residence principle. Private persons should be taxable 
where they reside and use public goods and services. In order to implement the resi-
dence principle, the first step should be to introduce automatic information exchange 
between countries.18 While the demand for an automatic information exchange be-
tween countries may sound modest, it would in fact require a much higher degree of 
international cooperation and greater constraints on national tax sovereignty than has 
heretofore been accepted by governments (see Rixen 2008, chapters 4 and 8). 
Second, with regard to the taxation of enterprises, TJN proposes a common, con-
solidated tax base that would be apportioned to the various countries according to a 
formula that is better able to capture the true economic contributions than the legal 
constructs on which the tax regime is currently based. Further, TJN proposes to adopt 
a general anti-avoidance principle in all national tax laws (TJN 2005a). 
In addition to demands for regulating tax competition, TJN also wants enterprises 
to refrain from tax planning and implement this as an important element of their 
“corporate social responsibility.” Under TJN’s proposal of “country-by-country 
reporting” MNEs would be obliged to disclose all their profits, the locations where 
these were made, and the locations where they were taxed (Murphy 2007a). These and 
other demands – e.g. the obligation not to make use of tax havens – are to be included 
in a corporate “Code of Conduct for Taxation,” developed by TJN (Murphy 2007b). 
States, enterprises, and tax consultants are supposed to comply voluntarily with this 
code of conduct, which goes far beyond the recommendations on taxation contained in 
                                                          
18 Currently, the tax authorities generally exchange information about taxpayers only on request. 
This is also the case even for the most recent information exchange agreements which developed out of 
the OECD Project on Harmful Tax Practices. Whereas these newer agreements foresee better, more 
viable information exchange than do the normal double taxation agreements, the reciprocal provision of 
taxpayer information still does not occur automatically. The EU’s Directive on the Taxation of Savings 
Income does foresee automatic information exchange (Sullivan 2007, 332-333). 
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the “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (OECD 2000). Compliance 
should be verified on a yearly basis by an independent expert commission. These 
recommendations are designed to generate transparency and create an ethically re-
sponsible tax culture.19 
With the exception of this last demand, which is a moral appeal to private enter-
prises backed up with a threatened loss of reputation, NGOs address states or interna-
tional governmental organizations to close the governance gap in international taxa-
tion. Although the interest of the broader public for international tax matters currently 
remains small, these developments show that international tax policy – for a long time 
the exclusive domain of technical experts and tax bureaucrats – is increasingly being 
subjected to public criticism and scrutiny according to criteria of the global common 
good. 
What are the Institutional Responses to the 
Politicization of International Taxation? 
This section of the paper deals with the institutional reactions to the increasing politi-
cization of international tax policy. I will first show that the institutional reforms that 
have been undertaken are insufficient to solve the issues raised by civil society actors. 
Second, given that governments and IGOs failed to meet the demands of civil society, 
it is interesting to analyze whether they have at least undertaken procedural reforms 
and have allowed civil society actors access to their decision-making processes. One 
may think that they would be interested to do this to mask their lack of success on the 
side of substantive policy reform. 
                                                          
19 The “responsible approach” to taxation supported by TJN does not perceive tax as a “cost” for 
enterprises, but rather – like dividends paid to shareholders – as a dividend payout from enterprise 
profits to the “stakeholders,” namely, society. Society deserves this share of the profits, because it 
provides the physical and social infrastructure for enterprises. “Tax is the return due on this investment 
by society from which companies benefit” (TJN 2007). 
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Politicization Has Not Succeeded – The Institutional 
Trajectory Remains Unchanged 
So what has happened with material institutional development? Has the effectiveness 
of international tax institutions improved, and has the governance gap been closed? 
What role do the demands of civil society play in this scenario? 
In response to the problem of tax competition, the international tax system has 
undergone a change, but this change takes on a peculiar form. The process can be 
characterized as rule stretching and layering (see e.g. Thelen 1999; Pierson 2004, 133-
166): the unilateral anti-avoidance measures and the continuing adjustments of transfer 
pricing regulations can be interpreted as rule stretching. Both reforms contradict the 
principle of sovereignty-preserving tax cooperation. CFC legislation violates the tenet 
of treating parts of an enterprise operating in different countries as essentially inde-
pendent units. It extends taxation into foreign territory by consolidating the accounts 
across borders for at least certain kinds of passive income. The new transfer pricing 
guidelines likewise involve an implicit consolidation of accounts across borders for 
those cases where the traditional methods of arm’s length pricing cannot be applied, 
which are numerous. With the introduction of advanced pricing agreements (APAs) – 
mechanisms under which MNEs and tax administrations basically commit themselves 
to certain prices before the transactions actually occur – the trend towards implicit 
consolidation of accounts has become more pronounced. In both cases, however, the 
basic principles of the tax regime were not amended accordingly (cf. e.g. Li 2003, 
105-116; Vincent 2005). Instead, actors re-construe the rules in such a way that they 
formally remain in line with the principle of sovereignty-preserving cooperation. 
Governments also follow a strategy of layering – that is, they create new institu-
tions, designed to provide a support structure for the DTA regime and thus to buttress 
its operability. The OECD Project on Harmful Tax Practices represents such an 
instance of layering. Although the project was ultimately not successful, what is 
remarkable about it is the fact that, for the first time in the history of global tax policy, 
the principle of sovereignty-preservation was openly questioned. This was possible 
precisely because it occurred outside the DTA regime. This is an advantage of layer-
ing: the question of consistency between the original rules and the layered rules does 
not have to be answered. Since the two institutions are formally separate, actors can 
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always retreat to the position that the old as well as the new rules demand full compli-
ance. 
This institutional trajectory results from a particular constellation of interests. On 
the one hand, governments do not want to capitulate defenselessly to tax competition; 
on the other hand, they do not want to endanger the established institutional arrange-
ment for the avoidance of double taxation. Third, there is a strong conflict of interests 
inherent in tax competition. Some countries, especially small ones, profit from tax 
competition, while others loose. The strategic structure is that of an asymmetric 
prisoner’s dilemma respectively Rambo game. 
Rule stretching and layering allow actors to preserve the coordinating function in 
the avoidance of double taxation, while they can at the same time limit at least some of 
the possibilities for tax arbitrage. Because the DTA regime is based on a non-binding 
consensus in the form of the model convention, countries proceed very cautiously in 
the battle against tax avoidance and tax competition.20 While in fact these rule changes 
imply an intervention into national tax systems, actors take great care to formally 
realign them with the traditional principle of preserving sovereignty. Since any rule 
changes need the approval of the winners of tax competition, who would block more 
fundamental reforms, there are only indirect and incremental rule changes. In conse-
quence, the DTA regime remains on its traditional institutional trajectory (see Rixen 
2008, 117-51 and 181-96 for a detailed account of the institutional trajectory). 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the incremental reforms can solve the prob-
lem effectively. Since no one really wants to challenge the validity of the DTA regime 
in principle, governments intervene in the system only selectively, targeting each 
specific international tax avoidance technique with a corresponding legal countermea-
sure. The problem with this strategy is that the taxpayers adjust their tax avoidance 
                                                          
20 Because the avoidance of double taxation is, in effect, a coordination game with a distributive 
conflict, it is difficult to exert institutional change. In this type of game, as soon as one of the possible 
equilibria has been chosen, no actor has an incentive to deviate from it. In particular, there are sunk 
costs invested into the construction of a focal point in the form of the model convention. In addition, 
there are specific investments of tax administrators who have learned to operate the existing rules. 
Further, the sovereignty preserving constitution of the tax regime can be interpreted as a source of 
positive feedback for the existing solution: the internationally guaranteed freedom of governments to 
design their national tax systems solely in accordance with their own wishes has made it possible for 
governments to incorporate specific regulations in their national legislation, which they can then use as 
a bargaining chip in treaty negotiations (Avery Jones 1999, 3-6; Vann 1991, 110). Thus, the construc-
tion of the tax system not only allows sovereignty to be preserved, it also reinforces the sovereignty-
preserving character (see Rixen 2008, 184-193). 
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strategies accordingly; they are quick to find new tax loopholes for minimizing their 
tax payments. The result is a “proliferation spiral,” in which the state reacts to the 
actions of taxpayers. An undesired side-effect of this is that tax law becomes increas-
ingly complex. This development can be described as an institutional drift because, on 
the one hand, repairs to the existing arrangement have to be constantly undertaken but, 
on the other, the governance gap will never be effectively closed. To actually close 
this gap would require a fundamental reform of the international tax regime, abrogat-
ing the absolute validity of the principle of sovereignty preservation; but governments 
do not agree on the desirability of such a reform.21 
We can conclude from this that civil society has not been able to influence the 
path of institutional development of the international tax regime thus far. Although, in 
the course of ever-increasing and more intense tax competition, the pressures to 
regulate tax competition have risen (and will continue to rise), governments and the 
OECD so far do not meet the demands of civil society. They are more concerned with 
further developing the present tax regime along the path predetermined by the tradi-
tional principles, and they attempt to ward off any far-reaching reform proposals. Thus 
the logic of institutional stability and the conflict of interests among governments in 
tax competition are a plausible explanation for the continuance of the governance gap 
in international taxation policy. 
Limited Access for Civil Society to International Organizations 
The OECD is an intergovernmental organization engaged in gathering and disseminat-
ing information, expertise, and non-binding policy recommendations. Insofar as the 
OECD actually influences policy developments, this influence is based on its authority 
as a source of objective expertise (Sharman 2006a). The OECD, since its inception, 
has granted access to civil society interests. This, however, has been limited to BIAC 
and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), both of whom have been granted 
                                                          
21 What is paradoxical about this situation is that governments fall into the tax competition trap 
precisely because they hold uncompromisingly onto formal tax sovereignty; but, by so doing, they are 
compelled to make specific tax policy adjustments—thus, de facto tax sovereignty has already been 
yielded. States can gain real sovereignty over tax revenues under conditions of globalization only if they 
accept to share de jure sovereignty with other states. Only collectively can states win back what they 
have lost individually. One potential reform would be the introduction of unitary taxation with formula 
apportionment (see e.g. Rixen/Uhl 2007). 
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official status as consultants. In the OECD’s CFA, only BIAC is represented and has 
taken active part in negotiations. Other civil society interests, in contrast, were not 
officially included. The OECD, at least in the area of taxation, insists that it is an 
organization of and for governments, and that, therefore, civil society participation 
should remain limited.22 
Despite this, the OECD has maintained informal relations and personal contact to 
tax activists. For example, Jeffrey Owens, Director of the CTPA (the OECD’s tax 
affairs department), accepted an invitation to a meeting of TJN’s steering committee 
and engaged in discussions with TJN activists on this occasion. Furthermore, Owens 
and other OECD employees regularly meet TJN representatives on a personal and 
informal basis to exchange and discuss their positions. Thus the OECD is indeed 
interested in the activists and even sympathetic to some of their demands (while they 
reject others as too extensive). In particular, within the framework of its Project on 
Harmful Tax Practices, the OECD explicitly advocates the regulation of tax competi-
tion; however, unlike TJN, the OECD does not categorically reject it entirely. Also, 
the OECD is not in favor of the creation of an international tax authority within the 
UN framework because, quite naturally, it sees itself as the legitimate organization in 
that position.23 
In any case, the OECD seems to have realized that it is necessary to make its own 
work more inclusive and transparent. In 2002, the OECD together with the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the UN jointly established the 
“International Tax Dialogue” (ITD). The ITD is designed to intensify communication 
between these organizations and national governments, and to contribute to a better 
dissemination of “best practice.” The establishment of the ITD was a follow-up to 
recommendations made at the First International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment (organized by the UN and held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002), which 
pushed for improvements in international tax cooperation. Whereas the ITD was “not 
at any stage [to] have any power to make, enforce or mediate binding tax rules” (IMF, 
                                                          
22 In other policy areas – development cooperation, for instance – the OECD has opened up to 
civil society input over the last ten years. Whereas NGOs have not been accorded any official status by 
the OECD, it does claim to have established relationships to a number of civil society groups, and it is 
making an effort to engage in a dialogue with various stakeholders (OECD 2005). 
23 This section is based on interviews with Bruno Gurtner (on 7 February 2008) and John Chris-
tensen (on 4 July 2008), both members of TJN’s International Steering Committee. 
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OECD and World Bank 2002), it contributes to greater public transparency. The ITD 
website <http://www.itdweb.org> has published a plethora of official documents on, 
and other contributions to, the discussion on international taxation policy; most of 
these, however, are directed more towards experts, rather than interested lay persons. 
Unlike the OECD, the United Nations is open to let civil society actors participate 
in its activities in the field of international tax policy. The UN has seized upon the 
dissatisfaction with the OECD as an exclusive organization. In the Financing for 
Development (FfD) Initiative (United Nations 2001), which is directed at various 
policy areas, international tax policy plays a prominent role. This initiative stresses the 
urgent necessity for significant intensification of international cooperation on matters 
of taxation. It has also generated a number of proposals for the creation of new institu-
tions or the reform of existing organizations.24 Civil society organizations have been 
closely involved in the FfD process: NGOs are regularly consulted; even for high-level 
intergovernmental meetings, they have access to government representatives (United 
Nations 2007). 
In the course of the FfD initiative, the UN upgraded its “ad hoc group of experts” 
and granted it the status of a special committee, viz., the “Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters”. Civil society actors have access to this 
body (United Nations 2005, paragraph 5).25 Thus, TJN began to lobby at the UN and 
particularly approached delegates from developing countries, making a concerted 
effort to raise the latter’s awareness of the problems of tax flight and tax competition, 
and to suggest possible solutions to these problems (Sikka 2006; Christensen 2007). 
Further, TJN proposed that the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
develop a “Code of Conduct on Cooperation in Combating Capital Flight and Interna-
tional Tax Evasion and Avoidance” (Gurtner and Picciotto 2006). 
                                                          
24 The “Zedillo Report” (United Nations 2001), among others, proposed the creation of a so-called 
“International Tax Organization.” The role of this organization, as described in that report, is essentially 
identical to the one proposed by TJN. The “Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on 
Financing for Development” (the final text of agreements and commitments adopted at that intergov-
ernmental meeting), which served as the preparatory basis for the subsequent Zedillo Report, no longer 
contained such a proposal. It did, however, call for an intensification of international tax cooperation. 
25 They had also been allowed to attend the meetings of the ad hoc group of experts. However, un-
til TJN actually showed its interest in participating, no civil society representatives, except for the 
International Chamber of Commerce, attended the meetings. When John Christensen of TJN first 
approached the Committee, the UN’s administrator replied to his question of whether they could attend 
the meetings that he had been waiting for such a request from civil society activists for decades. 
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The differences between the UN and the OECD in granting civil society groups 
access to decision-making processes can be explained by the fact that the UN is not 
influential in the area of economic policy-making. In order to develop any impact at 
all, the UN and its principals, many of whom are governments of developing coun-
tries, have a particular interest in getting civil society on their side. In this way they 
may hope to gain moral credibility, which may be instrumental in achieving their 
policy goals. Additionally, for some developing countries this may also involve 
considerations of functional efficiency (see Tallberg 2008, 10-4; Steffek 2008). 
Lacking enough resources to develop technical expertise themselves, they may wish to 
get access to the technical expertise of some civil society actors. 
In contrast to that, the OECD, while it can certainly not take binding decisions, 
has developed into the most well-known and most important forum for discussion of 
international tax policy because of its access to sufficient resources and its disposition 
over a large body of expertise. A stronger inclusion of civil society actors would thus 
endanger the OECD’s present status. In the first place, activists and their arguments 
could disrupt the presumably depoliticized discussion of technical-administrative 
details. Most importantly, this would contradict the interests of its member countries, 
whose desire it is to handle tax policy matters foremost as a national concern and to 
achieve nothing more on the international level than a sovereignty-preserving coordi-
nation of different national tax systems. In other words, in order for the UN to have 
any impact at all, it is dependent on cooperation with societal groups. Conversely, for 
the OECD, granting access to such groups is dangerous, even if it cannot completely 
ignore their demands. 
This suggests that civil society influence on intergovernmental tax policy making 
is still limited. First, while they have access to the UN, this channel of influence is not 
very effective. Even though the United Nations repeatedly claims to be an effective 
counterweight to the OECD in matters of international taxation (e.g. United Nations 
2005, 3), most observers think that the UN, in view of its limited resources, will not 
succeed in becoming a serious competitor for the OECD any time soon (Zagaris 2005, 
338). Even civil society support for the UN will, at best, only be able to change this 
situation in the long run. Second, civil society influence on the OECD is small. While 
civil society actors have informal access to the bureaucrats, their access to the organi-
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zation’s principals is negligible. Apparently, OECD governments do not see any 
functional need to grant them formal consultative status. Likewise, as long as decision 
making is based on intergovernmental consensus, OECD governments do not have to 
involve civil society actors in order to remedy any legitimacy deficit. In view of this 
constellation, what can be said is that the relevant institutions neither can nor want to 
fully ignore civil society protest but, at the same time, they do not acquiesce to its 
demands. Instead, they use civil society protest for their own purposes, insofar as it is 
useful to them; but they exclude this protest from their policy processes whenever it 
contradicts their, respectively their principals’ interests. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I show that international tax cooperation – a policy area which for a long 
time has been highly depoliticized – is undergoing a process of politicization. Norma-
tive demands by civil society occur with greater frequency and intensity. Even in the 
domain of taxation, which is at the core of the nation state, there has finally emerged a 
reframing of issues in terms of global instead of merely national justice (on the need 
for reframing the political struggles for justice, see Fraser 2005). 
Further, I show that this increased politicization has so far not resulted in signifi-
cant institutional change. While international governmental organizations and gov-
ernments have not been able to simply ignore civil society demands but in fact con-
sider them to be relevant, only the UN, as the less significant of the two main organi-
zations in international tax policy, has granted civil society formal access to consulta-
tion processes. The OECD is more conservative in this respect. 
The institutional development of international tax policy fits well into the picture 
drawn by Zürn et al. (2007) of the formation of international political order beyond the 
nation state in their first hypothesis. The sovereignty-preserving institutional arrange-
ment of intergovernmental cooperation focusing on the coordination of interfaces 
among nation states leads to unintended consequences in the form of tax competition. 
In response to this unintended consequence, transgovernmental administrative coop-
eration is intensified and new institutions are layered on top of the existing setup in 
order to support its viability. Likewise, in accordance with the first hypothesis, we can 
observe that the development of institutional change involves an intervention into 
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national tax policy that has not been foreseen by the traditional rules – in other words, 
the institutional change affects “behind-the-border” issues. 
Nevertheless – and this is a variation which was not addressed by Zürn et al. 
(2007), even though, presumably, it is not ruled out – the process of institutional 
development does not culminate in the genesis of an international institution of a new 
type. Rather, as described above, governments re-construe the de facto changes so 
that, at least formally, the rules remain compatible with the traditional principle of 
sovereignty-preservation. Thus, national governments have maneuvered the interna-
tional tax system and themselves into a collective self-deception by pursuing the idea 
that the prevention of tax competition and tax arbitrage are compatible with unre-
stricted national tax sovereignty. The actual behavior of governments, however, 
demonstrates the contrary. In fact, national tax sovereignty is already partially con-
strained through the incremental reforms. Thus, the international tax regime is in a 
protracted process of institutional drift away from the principle of sovereignty preser-
vation. 
Whether this process may lead to the creation of a new type of international insti-
tution is difficult to predict. As long as the actors involved succeed in sweeping the 
continually growing internal contradictions between the two aims of preserving 
sovereignty and hindering tax competition and arbitrage under the rug it is plausible 
that the present institutional trajectory can be stabilized. Alternatively, however, it is 
also conceivable that the contradictions will reach a critical level so that basic institu-
tional adjustments will have to take place (punctuated equilibrium). 
Even if it is the case that development is going in the direction of stronger inter-
vention into areas of national dominion, this tendency is not the catalyst which gener-
ates growing politicization. To the contrary, criticism is directed at the fact that tax 
competition is not adequately regulated. Politicization in the area of (direct) interna-
tional taxation policy is not a counter-response to the exercise of too much power or 
too much intervention by an international institution, but rather a reaction to the lack 
of such an institution. politicization crystallizes around a governance gap. This means 
that the processes described in Zürn et al. (2007) and thought to occur sequentially – 
viz., first comes institutional transformation in the sense of the first hypothesis, 
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followed by politicization in the sense of the second hypothesis – occur simultaneously 
in the case of international taxation. 
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